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Background: The recent Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak has been described as unprecedented in terms
of morbidity, mortality, and geographical extension. It also revealed many weaknesses and inadequacies for
disease surveillance and response systems in Africa due to underqualified staff, cultural beliefs, and lack of
trust for the formal health care sector. In 2014, Ghana had high risk of importation of EVD cases.
Objective: The objective of this study was to assess the EVD surveillance and response system in northern
Ghana.
Design: This was an observational study conducted among 47 health workers (district directors, medical,
disease control, and laboratory officers) in all 13 districts of the Upper East Region representing public,
mission, and private health services. A semi-structured questionnaire with focus on core and support
functions (e.g. detection, confirmation) was administered to the informants. Their responses were recorded
according to specific themes. In addition, 34 weekly Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response reports
(August 2014 to March 2015) were collated from each district.
Results: In 2014 and 2015, a total of 10 suspected Ebola cases were clinically diagnosed from four districts.
Out of the suspected cases, eight died and the cause of death was unexplained. All the 10 suspected cases were
reported, none was confirmed. The informants had knowledge on EVD surveillance and data reporting.
However, there were gaps such as delayed reporting, low quality protective equipment (e.g. gloves, aprons),
inadequate staff, and lack of laboratory capacity. The majority (38/47) of the respondents were not satisfied
with EVD surveillance system and response preparedness due to lack of infrared thermometers, ineffective
screening, and lack of isolation centres.
Conclusion: EVD surveillance and response preparedness is insufficient and the epidemic is a wake-up call
for early detection and response preparedness. Ebola surveillance remains a neglected public health issue.
Thus, disease surveillance strengthening is urgently needed in Ghana.
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Introduction
In December 2013, the largest Ebola virus disease (EVD)
outbreak began in West Africa (1). The current Ebola
outbreak has been described as unprecedented and its
public health impact in terms of morbidity, mortality, and
geographical extension has been far greater than pre-
viously experienced (13). Since September 2014, Ghana
had the highest probability of importation of EVD cases
via travellers from the most affected countries (traveller
volume of 25,272 by air travel) and followed closely by
Senegal (traveller volume of 20,818) in Africa (3). This
outbreak has revealed many weaknesses and inadequacies
for disease surveillance and response systems in develop-
ing countries. Low-income countries often lack the
needed health infrastructure to prevent and control an
outbreak (4). For instance, the most affected countries in
West Africa lack adequate laboratory, public health,
clinical personnel, appropriate equipment, supplies, and
protocol as well as qualified health workers (4). The
effects of the outbreak on the already weakened public
services and health systems has resulted in further
crippling of the health sector and increased the impact
of other endemic diseases and their associated deaths
(1, 5).
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Disease surveillance is the ongoing systematic collec-
tion, analysis, and interpretation of health data essential
for planning, implementation, and evaluation of public
health practice, closely integrated with timely dissemina-
tion of these data to those who need to know (6, 7). In
spite of increased efforts in strengthening health systems,
many countries still do not possess the requisite core
health system capacities (4). In particular, the purpose of
International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) is to pre-
vent, protect against, control, and provide public health
response to the international spread of disease in ways
that are vital and limited to public health risk (8, 9). As
a result, planning and decision-making is based on
unreliable and low quality data (10, 11). In view of this,
the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa
(WHO-AFRO) and other partners were asked by the
various ministries of health to develop strategies that would
enable countries to prepare and respond adequately and
overall strengthen surveillance capacities (12). In 1998,
WHO-AFRO adopted the Integrated Disease Surveil-
lance and Response (IDSR) strategy for its member
countries as a comprehensive public health strategy
(8, 1317). The goal of the IDSR strategy is to build
member countries capacity to detect, report, and effec-
tively respond to priority diseases (e.g. Ebola) as well as
to link laboratory activities for public health action
(14, 1820). In Ghana, Ebola is one of the 43 diseases
that are reported under the surveillance system (9, 20).
EVD response preparedness in Ghana
In Ghana, the Public Health Emergency Management
Committees (PHEMC) at the regional and district levels
are responsible for overseeing and implementing the
epidemic response plans. The PHEMCs are coordination
committees composed of technical and non-technical
members (e.g. municipal/district chief executive, police
commander, director of health service, public health nurse,
disease control officer, environmental health officer,
medical or clinical officer, veterinary experts, laboratory
technician/technologist, and Red Cross) (8). A Rapid
Response Team (RRT) is a technical, multi-disciplinary
team that is readily available for mobilisation and de-
ployment in cases of emergencies. The members of the
epidemic RRT include a disease control officer, laboratory
technician, clinician, environmental health officer, veter-
inary, and others, based on availability of the technical
staff and specificity of the outbreak. For EVD response
preparedness, the district RRT is responsible for public
sensitisation, clinician sensitisation, and active surveil-
lance. It includes investigation of rumours, outbreaks,
and other public health emergencies; proposing control
measures including risk communication activities; and
coordinating rapid response (8).
In Ghana, the EVD response plan had the following
components: risk communication-social mobilisation and
health education, epidemiological and laboratory surveil-
lance, case management, logistics, security, and financial
resources and coordination. In implementing the plan,
public sensitisation, clinician sensitisation, and active sur-
veillance are carried out with key messages (e.g. the imme-
diate seeking of health care when EVD is suspected).
Frontline health workers are trained to identify any
suspected cases. The response teams are on the alert to
pick, package, and transport specimens to the reference
laboratory for confirmation. The core members of the
response team include the municipal/district director of
health service and disease control, laboratory, and health
promotion officers. The laboratory officer is responsible
for collecting specimens, document appropriately, store,
perform laboratory analysis for presumptive diagnosis,
provide results to clinical staff and patients, report results
to disease control office, and report observed changes
in trends during routine analysis of specimens in the
laboratory. The medical officer/clinician is responsible for
ensuring the availability of isolation wards for suspected
EVD cases, keeping suspected cases at the hospital or
health facility for the rapid response team, and report-
ing suspected cases to the district director for planning
and decision-making as well as the provision of needed
logistics. The objective of this study was to assess the




Ghana is situated in West Africa and bordered by Ivory
Coast to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to the
east, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. It has a total
land area of 238,537 km2. The country is composed of
10 administrative regions and 216 districts and a popula-
tion of about 25 million in 2010 (11, 21, 22). The Upper
East Region (UER) is bordered by Burkina Faso to the
north and Togo to the east (11, 23, 24). It is made of three
Municipals (Bolgatanga, Kassena-Nankana, and Bawku)
and 10 districts (Builsa North, Builsa South, Kassena-
Nankana West, Bongo, Garu-Tempane, Talensi, Nabdam,
Bawku West, Binduri, and Pusiga). The ecological char-
acteristic of the Region is that of Sahel with semi-arid
Guinea savannah vegetation. There is one rainy season
in each year from June to October. The economy of
Ghana has undergone minimal changes over the past two
decades (22). According to the World Bank, the annual
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of Ghana was
4.8% in 2009 and increased until it reached 14.0% in 2011.
From 2012, with an annual GDP growth rate of 9.3%,
the economy declined further to 3.4% in 2015 (25).
Between 2013 and 2014, the GDP declined from
USD48.6 billion dollars in 2013 (7.3% annual growth
rate) to USD38.6 billion in 2014 (4.2% annual growth rate)
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(22, 25). The annual GDP growth rate of 4.2% in 2014 was
even lower than the 5.9% reported in 2005. At the national
level, the agriculture sector has been overtaken by the
service and industry sectors. By 2014, the service sector
(52%) and industry sector (27%) contributed nearly 80%
of the GDP (22). The common export commodities
include cocoa, gold, and timber. In recent years, the
economy has slightly diversified to include export of non-
traditional commodities such as pineapples, bananas,
yams, and cashew nuts (22). In 2013, the total health
expenditure was nearly 10% of the GDP in 2013. However
in the UER, the local economy depends on subsistence
agriculture and the crops commonly cultivated include
millet, maize, sorghum, and rice (20, 26). The majority
of the people live in rural settings, and households are
grouped into extended family units/compounds (27). In
Ghana, the infant mortality rate is 41 deaths per 1,000 live
births and the under 5-years of age mortality is slightly
above 60 deaths per 1,000 live births. In UER, infant
mortality rate is 46 deaths per 1,000 live births and the
under-5 years of age mortality rate is 72 deaths per 1,000
live births, which are above the national rates (22). Ghana
has one of the lowest total fertility rates (4.2 children per
woman) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It decline from
6.4 children per woman in 1988 to 4.2 children per woman
in 2014 (22).
Ghana health care system
Ghana’s health care system is organised in a three-tier
system (i.e. district, regional, and national). This is further
structured into five levels; community, sub-district, dis-
trict, regional, and national (20). The smallest unit of the
health system is the community-based health planning
and services (CHPS), which is responsible for the provi-
sion of community level health activities including the
treatment of minor ailments, home-visits, community
outreaches, education and health promotion (20, 28).
The Primary Health Care (PHC) system is delivered by
the district health system and entails all institutions
including CHPS, health centres, clinics, and hospitals
(20). In Ghana, each district is served or supposed to be
served by a hospital, several health centres, private and
mission clinics, and CHPS Compounds (20, 28). The
district hospital serves as the first referral point in the
PHC system in the country (20, 28, 29), where clinical,
surgical, laboratory, and maternity services are provided.
For the purpose of surveillance, all institutions (public,
private, non-governmental organisations, etc.) with out-
patient and/or inpatient facilities are described as health
facilities. A sub-district is a health implementation unit
within the district that generally serves a maximum
population of 30,000 people. A district is described as a
decentralised administrative unit in the country that
serves a population of 80,000 to 120,000 people (8). The
region is the main administrative unit with a number of
decentralised districts (e.g. 13 districts in UER), while
the national level of administration is where policies are
set and resources are allocated. In relation to surveillance,
the national level reports on priority diseases based on a
decision instrument to report events of public health
concern to WHO. Malaria, gastroenteritis, and acute
respiratory infection are the main causes of morbidity and
mortality in the study area, and outbreaks of meningitis
also occur periodically (20, 26).
Surveillance and diagnostic procedures in Ghana
At the health facility level, standard case definitions
are used to identify suspected cases. According to the
Ghana IDSR technical guidelines (May 2011), Ebola or
Marburg viral haemorrhagic fevers are classified as
suspected or confirmed cases. ‘A suspected case is any
person reporting with fever and has no response to usual
treatment in the area, and at least one of the following
signs: bloody diarrhoea, bleed from gums, bleeding into
skin (purpura), bleeding into eyes and urine’ (9). ‘A
confirmed case is any suspected case with laboratory
confirmation (positive IgM antibody, positive Polymerase
Chain Reaction or viral isolation), or epidemiologic link
to confirmed cases or outbreak’ (9). These definitions are
general and lack details and specifics. A suspected case of
Ebola or Marburg viral haemorrhagic fever is confirmed
by laboratory confirmation using positive IgM anti-
body, positive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or viral
isolation, or epidemiologic link to confirmed cases
or outbreak (9). The information includes suspected,
laboratory confirmed cases, and deaths (20, 29, 30).
The standard case definitions in the IDSR technical
guidelines are a set of criteria used to decide whether a
person has a particular disease or condition (9, 20).
However, there are several diseases with similar signs and
symptoms. Thus, biological specimens are required to be
collected, stored, and processed to achieve specific diag-
noses (e.g. malaria and suspected Ebola) (9). For suspec-
ted diseases for which a health centre/clinic lacks the
capacity to perform laboratory tests for confirmation,
specimens are sent to the district hospital or the district
health administration (DHA) for onward delivery at a
designated reference laboratory (e.g. meningitis or Ebola)
(20). The specimens are transported from health facilities
or district or regional levels to the reference laboratories.
In Ghana, the important referral laboratories include
the Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research
(NMIMR) and the National Public Health Reference
Laboratories in Accra (e.g. polio and Ebola).
Ebola case definition during the outbreak in
West Africa
During the peak of Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the
health system in Ghana revised its Ebola case definition
to reflect the prevailing situation. This information was
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then distributed to all levels of the health system across
the country.
Alert case: any ill person with onset of fever and not
responding to treatment for common causes of fever in
the area and or any ill person with at least one of the
following signs: bleeding, bloody diarrhoea, blood in
urine, or any sudden death.
Suspected case: any person alive or dead, suffering or
having suffered from a sudden onset of high fever and
having had contact with a suspected, probable or con-
firmed Ebola case; or any person with sudden onset of
high fever and at least three of the following symptoms:
headache, anorexia (loss of appetite), lethargy, aching
muscles or joints, breathing difficulties, vomiting, diar-
rhoea, stomach, difficulty swallowing, and hiccups. A
suspected case is also any person with inexplicable
bleeding or any sudden inexplicable death.
Probable case: any deceased suspected case (if it has not
been possible to collect specimens for laboratory con-
firmation) having an epidemiological link with a con-
firmed Ebola case or any suspected case evaluated by a
clinician.
Confirmed case: any suspected or probable case with a
positive laboratory result; laboratory confirmed cases
must test positive for the virus antigen, either by detection
of virus ribonucleic acid (RNA) by reverse transcriptase-
PCR (RT-PCR), or by detection of IgM antibodies
directed against Ebola.
Study design
This was an observational cross-sectional study con-
ducted among 47 frontline health workers in all the
13 districts of UER to query key informants who are
responsible for health care delivery at the district level.
The definition of frontline health worker in this study
includes permanent staff such as medical doctors, direc-
tors of district health services, disease control/surveil-
lance officers, and laboratory officers) of public, private,
and mission hospitals and the DHA. Interviews were
conducted on the core and support functions of disease
surveillance and satisfaction of the Ebola surveillance sys-
tem using a semi-structured questionnaire. The UER is
one of the three northern regions of Ghana. Bolgatanga
is the regional capital of UER and it is about 782 km
from the Accra (national capital of Ghana). The distance
from Accra to Paga border (the GhanaBurkina Faso
border) is about 822 km while Accra to Pusiga border
(GhanaTogo border) is about 860 km. There is one
main standard road from Accra through Bolgatanga and
Paga to Burkina Faso, while the road leading from
Bolgatanga to Togo is in a poor state and partly untarred.
Often, it takes about 1215 hours to travel by road from
Accra to either border. Thus, the region is remote from
the national capital and has a higher likelihood of Ebola
importation due to its borders.
Key informants selection
At each district, one medical officer or medical/physician
assistant, one laboratory officer, one disease control
officer, and one director of DHA participated in the study.
Ideally, each DHA is supposed to have district officers (e.g.
director of health service, medical officer, disease control
officer and laboratory officer). However, some districts
do not have district hospitals and medical officers such
as Builsa South, Binduri, and Nabdam. In addition, the
Binduri and Nabdam districts do not have laboratory
officers. In each district, the above officers are standard
required staff for the health system. The responsibilities
during the peak of Ebola outbreak remained the same.
The medical officer is responsible for generating surveil-
lance information using clinical diagnosis. When a person
visits any health facility such as a hospital, health
centre, clinic, or CHPS Compound to seek health care,
the personal information of the person is collected and
recorded in a register at the Out-Patient Department.
Then the person goes to the consulting room to be
diagnosed by a medical officer or physician assistant. In
the consulting room, additional information is collected
from the person. This information is recorded in the
consulting room register as provisional diagnosis. The
suspected case is then referred to the laboratory for
further investigation and confirmation depending on the
signs and symptoms (20). There are standard criteria
for referring patients to the laboratory. For example, all
suspected malaria cases must be referred to the laboratory
for testing. The laboratory officer is responsible for taking
the samples for investigation and further analysis. After
the samples from suspected cases have been tested in the
laboratory, the medical officer updates the consulting
room register with the information of principal diagnosis
and/or additional diagnosis. The disease control officer
collates daily, the number of suspected cases, confirmed
cases and deaths using the consulting room registers,
laboratory registers and in-patient registers as sources of
data. This information is submitted to the DHA using the
weekly and monthly IDSR reporting forms. They also
conduct case contact tracing in the communities. The
health administration director is responsible for planning
and decision-making at the district health system.
Eligibility for the key informants included: 1) work
with the district health system; 2) familiarity and active
involvement or likelihood of involvement when EVD is
reported; 3) willingness to participate; and 4) completion
of written consent were required before the interviews
were conducted. On the day of the field visit, they were
interviewed using a semi-structured questionnaire. If
any of them were not available on the day of the visit,
arrangements were made for a revisit. However, new
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employees (less than 3 months in a position) were
excluded. The older employees were included in order
that they may have adequate and accurate information
regarding changes on disease surveillance before and
during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.
Data collection
A total of 47 key informant interviews were conducted.
The main issues addressed in the questionnaire were 1)
core functions of the surveillance system (e.g. detection
and registration, and response); 2) support functions (e.g.
training) and 3) satisfaction and challenges with Ebola
surveillance. Examples of the questions included ‘What
are the signs and symptom for suspected EVD? How did
your district or region investigate rumours of suspected
Ebola cases?’ In addition, 34 weekly IDSR reports
(August 2014 to March 2015) were collated from each
district. The research team considered August 2014 as the
peak of the outbreak with high risk of spread to other
countries including Ghana. Two assistants were trained
and they assisted with the data collection from 25 May to
6 June 2015.
Data analysis
Only frequencies of suspected cases were produced from
the IDSRweekly reports. For the qualitative data analysis,
the responses of the informants were transcribed from the
semi-structured questionnaire, and the transcripts were
read multiple of times to identify critical responses on the
major components of the EVD responses preparedness as
well as specific themes based on the IDSR technical
guidelines, such as surveillance core functions (detection,
registration, confirmation, reporting, analysis, and epi-
demic preparedness) and support functions (supervision,
training, and resources). The perspective of the key
informants on the state of the EVD surveillance pre-
paredness and response were also captured.
Ethical considerations
Individual written informed consent was obtained
before the interviews were conducted. The Navrongo
Health Research Centre Institutional Review Board
(NHRCIRB155) granted ethical approval. Permission
was also received from the regional health directorate
of Ghana Health Service.
Results
Background information on respondents
Table 1 shows the background information of the
informants. The majority of the informants interviewed
were males (39/47). All the females were district directors
of health service. Among the category of directors,
females were the majority (8/13). The remaining 34 in-
formants were males working as medical officers (10),
disease control officers (13), laboratory officers (10), and
a hospital administrator (1).
Quantitative data
Table 2 shows weekly IDSR data over the 34 weeks of
clinically diagnosed EVD cases. Four out of the 13
districts reported 10 EVD cases. The Bawku West district
and Bawku Municipal accounted for the majority of the
cases and eight of the suspected cases died. All the
suspected EVD cases were identified due to their bleeding
state (e.g. snake bite, bleeding due to pregnancy, and
coughing with blood due to tuberculosis) or having high
temperature above 388C. The causes of death among
the suspected cases were unexplained. Bawku Municipal
was the only district that reported a case in 2015. The
10 suspected cases that were reported, none was con-
firmed (i.e. positive for the virus antigen).
Qualitative data
In total, 47 key informants were interviewed on EVD
surveillance and response preparedness. The informants
included 10 medical officers/physician assistants, 13
district directors, 13 disease control officers, 10 labora-
tory officers and one hospital administrator. Generally,
their answers were similar, and the EVD surveillance
challenges were cross-cutting in the region.
Overall EVD surveillance and response preparedness
The informants had mixed views on the Ebola surveillance.
Less than half (6 of 13) of districts had public hospitals
which is below the required number. The remaining
districts are served by health centres and private hospitals.
Only eight of the workers said that they were satisfied with
EVD surveillance system. The majority were not satisfied
with the surveillance system due to lack of infra-red
Table 1. Background information of respondents in Upper
East Region Ghana
Position of respondent Gender Frequency
1. Municipal Directors of Ghana Health Males 1
Service Female 2
2. District Directors of Ghana Health Male 4
Service Female 6
3. Municipal Disease Control Officers Male 3
Female 0
4. District Disease Control Officers Male 10
Female 0
5. Medical Officers of Municipal Hospital Male 3
Female 0
3. Medical Officers of District Hospital Male 7
Female 0
4 Staff of Hospital Laboratory Officers Male 10
Female 0
5. Hospital General Manager Male 1
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thermometers, inadequate equipment, ineffective screen-
ing, inadequate staff, and lack of isolation centres.
We did not even have infra-red thermometers at the
peak of the epidemic and we still have gaps in terms
of PPEs; the waiting centre at the border is a small
room with no fence and there are only two beds in
that isolation centre. (District Director of Health
Service 3)
The surveillance system is okay but the screening
for suspected EVD cases is ineffective. There are no
gloves for workers. If there was one EVD case, all
the PPEs will be used and they were even of low
quality. If Ebola happens in Ghana, we will not
survive it. (Municipal Disease Control Officer 1)
EVD detection and confirmation
The majority (46/47) of the informants had general
knowledge on Ebola surveillance. However, less than
half (20/47) described the existing surveillance system to
be functional. They reported that the thermometers were
inaccurate resulting in the under- or over-estimation of
suspected cases since high temperature is the main key
detection criterion. There were no specific registers for
recording of EVD data in the districts.
It was difficult to differentiate Ebola suspected
cases from malaria. The emphasis was on the high
temperature and it was too sensitive to be used
for Ebola. It meant that everyone who came to the
hospital was suspected of Ebola. In addition, the
thermometer calibration had problems. Some of
the thermometers were under reading the tempera-
ture of patients. (District Medical Officer 5)
Over half (33/47) of the informants reported that there
were problems with screening and recording of suspected
EVD cases. These included absolute no screening, in-
adequate logistics, inadequate health workers, and irre-
gular use of personal protective equipment (PPE). All the
districts had no capacity to confirm suspected EVD cases
using laboratory procedures. Besides, there were other
challenges such as fear among health workers, lack of
holding centres and cultural barriers (e.g. immediate
burials, touching of the dead by relatives).
The PPEs are not regularly used and they are of
low quality. We heard of fear among health workers
who were supposed to take the specimens from
suspected cases in Bolgatanga. In addition, there
is no isolation place for suspected cases. Patients
come to the OPD (Out Patient Department) and
sit together which exposes everyone to the disease if
there were true Ebola cases. (District Director of
Health Service 1)
EVD data reporting, feedback, and response
preparedness
Nearly three-quarters (34/47) of the informants reported
that, the routine disease surveillance data reporting was
good and that they regularly submitted weekly and
monthly IDSR reports. Paper-based surveillance data, is
sent from the health facilities to the DHA, but for
suspected Ebola cases, the information was largely
transmitted by mobile phone. Challenges of EVD data
reporting included non-involvement of laboratory staff,
lack of transport medium for specimens, delays, irregular
reporting and inadequate staff.
The Ebola reporting is not different from other
diseases except that more attention was given to it.
For example, there was rapid response from the region
when suspected cases were reported compared to
Table 2. Reported cases of suspected EVD in Upper East Region (2014 and 2015), Ghana
Acute haemorrhagic fever (e.g. Ebola) 2014 (week number 3252) 2015 (week number 0113)
Districts Population in 2014 Suspected Confirmed Death Suspected Confirmed Death
Bawku Municipal 103,354 3 0 3 1 0 0
Bawku West 98,630 4 0 3 0 0 0
Binduri 64,585 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bolgatanga Municipal 137,979 1 0 1 0 0 0
Bongo 88,677 0 0 0 0 0 0
Builsa North 59,237 0 0 0 0 0 0
Builsa South 38,298 0 0 0 0 0 0
Garu Tempane 136,356 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kassena Nankana Municipal 115,317 1 0 1 0 0 0
Kassena Nankana West 74,121 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nabdam 35,479 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pusiga 60,496 0 0 0 0 0 0
Talensi 85,162 0 0 0 0 0 0
Upper East Region 1,097,691 9 0 8 1 0 0
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other diseases like tuberculosis. (District Disease
Control Officer 3)
Problems of reporting are inadequate means of
transport and lack of transport medium for speci-
mens from the district to the region. The district has
human resource and internet service challenges
which hamper surveillance data reporting. (District
Laboratory Officer 1)
About half (25/47) of the interviewees indicated that,
general surveillance data was analysed at the district level
but often not posted on the notice board for the public.
The majority (41/47) of the informants indicated that
there is a response system in place for suspected EVD
cases. The response include specimen taking and report-
ing to the relevant authorities for appropriate public
health action. About three-quarters (34/47) of informants
reported that there is a feedback on the suspected EVD
cases in the form of bulletin through email system to the
districts from the region. However, written reports were
irregular. Apart from investigations by phone in case of
rumours, feedback, and information on EVD surveillance
to health facilities only took place during the monthly unit
head meetings or bi-annual or annual review meetings.
We had three suspected cases in the district. When
we got the rumors, we followed to the communities
to identify the index case, the close contacts and to
identify if others had developed similar signs and
symptoms. (District Director of Health Service 5)
Generally, feedback on disease surveillance to health
facilities is often delayed until monthly, quarterly
or bi-annual review meetings. (District Medical
Officer 10)
EVD surveillance supervision and training
The majority of the respondents (36/47) indicated that the
districts or hospitals have been supervised by the regional
health directorate or national level. However, these visits
were irregular and also not purposely for EVD surveil-
lance. All the districts had a trained disease control
officers. Only a minority (7/47) of the informants were
not trained on Ebola. The challenges associated with
training were inadequate knowledge, inadequate funding
and lack of interest.
Immediately the first suspected EVD case was
reported, there was a team from the national level
to the region. It was a single visit on HIV/AIDS but
they added Ebola during the discussion. (Municipal
Medical Officer 3)
We had training at the region on general IDSR
including Ebola which was organized by regional
health administration. The training was on what
happened in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea
based on the Ghanaian delegation that visited those
countries to learn and support them to control the
outbreak. (District Disease Control Officer 4)
EVD surveillance resources and satisfaction
Nearly all the informants (45/47) reported that the dis-
tricts received some resources (e.g. posters, gloves, in-
fra-red thermometers, aprons, bleaches, and sanitizers).
According to the informants, the PPEs were of low
quality and inadequate. Generally, the majority (38/47) of
the informants said that the Ebola surveillance system
was not well-functioning and unsatisfactory. The reasons
included inadequate resources and ineffective screening.
We received PPEs such as overalls, aprons, gloves
and sanitizers. The overalls that were given are low
quality compared to what was used in the three
most affected countries according to the regional
team that visited those countries. (District Director
of Health Service 3)
We are a country with strategies and plans, but we
execute none of them. The plans regarding Ebola
prevention and quality of PPEs that were provided
shows clearly that we were not ready for the disease.
The PPES were of low quality and our borders
are porous making it difficult to screen travelers.
(District Director of Health Service 4)
Discussion
The current study addresses an important global public
health topic, EVD surveillance and response prepared-
ness in the context of health system strengthening. The
main findings from this study revealed that there are still
major gaps in terms of proper functioning of disease
surveillance and response preparedness after a decade of
IDSR implementation in Ghana. These problems range
from validity and quality of suspected EVD data; to prob-
lems regarding specimen taking, analysis, and confirma-
tion and feedback; to problems of inadequate resources.
Though some countries in SSA have shown some impro-
vements in disease surveillance activities with increased
potential for rapid dissemination of information (11, 14,
16, 31), findings from the current study in northern
Ghana rather revealed that late case detection and
delays to provide health care services to suspected Ebola
patients at health facilities are common practices leading
to preventable deaths.
There have been reported cases of clinically diagnosed
EVD in northern Ghana. It is reassuring that none of
the 10 suspected cases in UER was confirmed. However,
the eight deaths among the suspected cases due to other
causes are a real problem. Largely, it revealed challenges
regarding reliability of clinically diagnosed data, accu-
racy, staff competencies, and commitment. The reported
challenges with the rumoured EVD cases are likely attri-
butable to negative attitudes of staff, lack of commitment,
fear and panic, lack of PPE, and general lack of skills
and competency among health workers, as previously
reported in SSA countries (11, 13).
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Previous studies in northern Ghana indicated that
IDSR strategy has contributed to increased surveillance
report submission as well as analysis of surveillance
data (20). This is similar to the current findings, which
indicated that surveillance data has been reported reg-
ularly using the IDSRweekly forms. Specifically for Ebola
surveillance, data reporting is through mobile phones.
This is an important approach adopted in the health
system to improve reporting timeliness and response.
EVD surveillance core functions and response
preparedness
The findings revealed problems in EVD case screening
and detection in northern Ghana. The factors contribut-
ing to the difficulties in screening and case detection are
lack of appropriate equipment (e.g. infra-red thermo-
meters) and problems of overlapping signs and symptoms
which mimic other diseases such as malaria, which is the
most prevalent disease in Africa. This revelation sup-
ports similar reports from SSA countries (14, 16, 20, 31).
Except for consulting room registers for capturing
patient’s personal and clinically diagnosed information,
there are no specific registers for recording Ebola cases.
The non-existence of such a register contributes to mis-
reporting of surveillance data. The study also revealed
difficulties in the confirmation of clinically diagnosed
cases due to ill-equipped laboratories and overall limited
laboratory capacity. Appropriate implementation of the
IDSR strategy components remains a challenge to be
resolved. Thus, the possibility of missing the opportunity
for early detection and outbreaks due to lack of skills,
competencies, and general fear among health workers
must be considered a real public health problem. This has
been confirmed in the recent outbreak of Ebola in West
Africa, where many of the cases were not identified or
confirmed on time (32). This is similar to the findings in
our study in which none of the suspected EVD cases were
confirmed. As a wake-up call, better public information
and communication on Ebola, improvement in staff
negative attitudes and skills, competencies, and commit-
ment are needed urgently for well-functioning surveil-
lance and response preparedness.
It was repeatedly reported by the informants that
weekly IDSR forms were available and accessible, which
is likely to contribute to report submission but does not
guarantee the quality of data on specific diseases. Besides,
EVD data is reported mainly through mobile phone call
first before completion of IDSR forms with potential to
affect data verification and validation. To address this
problem, district and regional level health workers mostly
visit the disease control office to cross-check the electro-
nic data compared with the paper-based IDSR data.
In previous studies, IDSR forms were rather unavailable
at the health facility level (20, 33). Considering the high
case fatality rate of EVD, the reported initiative of using
mobile phone calls or texting to alert the next level of
the health system should be deemed innovative and
encouraging. In addition, the electronic reporting on
disease surveillance data is another strategy that ensures
that data in readily usable form is available. This would
also reduce the problems of lack of transport, fuel, and
traveling from health facilities to districts and from
districts to the region for reports submission. Quality
data can improve analysis capability, data availability for
comparison, early warning based on increasing trends,
and response preparedness. This has been reported in
previous studies from developing countries that electronic
reporting of surveillance data has a potential to improve
early detection of emerging and re-emerging diseases
(13, 20, 31, 34).
The district hospital remains the first referral point of
contact with the population for suspected EVD cases.
However, feedback to periphery facilities is still rare and
irregular in most of SSA except during epidemics (14, 16,
20, 31). Disease surveillance feedback has been described
as one of the most important activities for improving
health workers capacities and performance (35). This
study has revealed that health workers at the district
level receive electronic feedback through email system
while community durbars or gatherings are platforms for
surveillance information dissemination to the population.
The health facilities (e.g. hospitals, health centres, and
clinics) did not have access to feedback immediately
except through their district directors.
EVD surveillance support functions and response
preparedness
The findings from this study demonstrate that super-
vision for surveillance at the district or hospital is rather
irregular and also not for Ebola, which supports previous
findings (13, 14). Although there is some improvement in
the training and employment of disease control officers,
they remain inefficient and ineffective. The informants
confirmed the existence of problems such as inadequate
staff, inadequate funding, frequent staff turnover, low-
quality PPEs, limited resources, and poorly equipped
laboratories seriously affecting disease surveillance activ-
ities. Similar findings have been reported in previous
studies in Ghana (20, 36).
EVD surveillance and response preparedness
satisfaction
The findings from this study confirm that surveillance
activities for EVD are not satisfactory. Though there is
good will from the government, international community,
and the national health authorities to provide resources,
the PPEs are generally of low quality. The informants
cited the porous nature of the country borders, ineffec-
tive screening, fear and panic among health workers,
and lack of laboratory capacity as reasons for their
conclusion. Beside, health workers are helpless due to
Martin N. Adokiya and John K. Awoonor-Williams
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their overreliance on God for Ebola prevention and
strong cultural practices (e.g. burial processes).
The study has some limitations. First, as the inves-
tigations were limited to only UER, findings are not
representative of the entire health system in Ghana.
Second, most of the information was self-reported among
health workers and is thus likely influenced by pers-
pective of being health workers. In addition, there was
no true Ebola case in the study to determine the real
response preparedness.
Conclusion
In conclusion, although the IDSR system has improved
availability of surveillance reporting, EVD surveillance is
still insufficient, particularly the lack of registers for Ebola
data, inadequate PPEs, burial practices, lack of labora-
tory capacity, and delays in specimen taking. The Ebola
epidemic is a wake-up call for early case detection and
response preparedness to prevent outbreaks and spread.
This topic remains a neglected public health issue in SSA,
including Ghana. Increasing attention and reaching out
to other stakeholders is essential for the overall function-
ing of the health system. Thus, more efforts on disease
surveillance and prevention activities are urgently needed.
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